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Horgan v. Felton, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 53 (November 21, 2007)1 
 
PROPERTY– ATTORNEY FEES  
 
Summary 
 
 This opinion focuses on the district court’s judgment awarding attorney fees as 
damages in a suit to quiet title. The Court reexamines their decision in Sandy Valley 
Associates v. Sky Ranch Estates2 and restates the rule set forth in that case.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Affirmed in part and reversed in part.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 This case was brought forth by several homeowners in Glenbrook, Nevada 
(collectively referred to as the “Horgan group”), seeking declaratory relief and to quiet 
title on a recreational beach easement identified as Golf Links Road. This road provides 
access to the homeowners’ residences and to the beach. The defendants include Daiss, 
Jepsen Properties, and the Biggs, whose parcels are benefited by the recreational beach 
easement, and the Feltons, whose property does not benefit from the easement. Daiss 
owns the recreational easement.   
 
 The Horgan group sought a declaration that they were the owners of Golf Links 
Road. They also sought an order that Daiss and the Felton remove improvements and an 
order requiring that Daiss and the Feltons re-grade and repave the road. The district court 
held that the Horgan group, and their predecessors, have continuously used the 
recreational easement and their right to the recreational easement has not been 
extinguished. The court further held that the original grantor’s reservation runs with the 
land and set forth rules pertaining to the use of the easement. The court awarded attorney 
fees in favor of the Horgan group. The parties appealed and cross-appealed.  
 
Discussion 
 
The Court sets forth the following issues to be determined: 
1. “Whether Jepsen Properties and the Biggs extinguished a portion of the 
recreational easement; 
2. Whether the right to promulgate rules concerning the reasonable use of the 
recreational easement under the deed survived the grantor and vested in the 
servient tenants; 
3. Whether the district court has rulemaking authority under the deed; and 
4. Whether attorney fees are appropriate in this case.”3 
                                                 
1 By Krystal Gallagher.  
2 117 Nev. 948, 35 P.3d 964 (2001). 
3 123 Nev., Adv. Op. 53, p. 4-5 (November 21, 2007). 
 1
 The Court finds Jepsen Properties and the Biggs did not extinguish a portion of 
the recreational easement by adverse use. The record does not show “Jepsen Properties 
and the Biggs adversely, continuously used any portion of the recreational easement over 
the required five-year prescription period.”4 Therefore, they failed to extinguish any part 
of the easement. The Court reasons that most of the properties are vacation homes and 
since they are not occupied on a year round basis, they could act to exclude Horgan group 
from using the easement. The Daiss group attempted to exclude the Horgan group by 
installing sprinkler systems, landscaping, and fences on or across the bluff the Horgan 
group used to get to the recreational easement. However, the Horgan group was still able 
to access, and make use of, the easement by climbing over or walking around the fences.  
 
 Jepsen and the Biggs argue the rulemaking authority of the servient landowner 
was reserved to only the “first part” based on the language of the grant. The Court 
disagrees and holds that the burden of an easement is appurtenant and the rights or 
obligations of servitude are tied to ownership or occupancy, not an individual. However, 
the deed did not provide the district court with rulemaking authority. Therefore, the Court 
holds the district court erred in promulgating specific rules for the use of the easement 
and reverses that portion of the district court’s decision. “The district court has no 
rulemaking authority under the deed in the first instance.”5  
 
 The issue the Court looks most closely at is whether attorney fees as special 
damages are appropriate. The Court states that attorney fees are generally not recoverable 
without a statute, rule, or contractual provisions that states otherwise. An exception is that 
district courts may award attorney fees as special damages in some circumstances. The 
Court takes the opportunity to clarify the language in Sandy Valley Associates v. Sky 
Ranch Estates,6 which the Horgan group uses as support for their award of attorney fees. 
  
 In Sandy Valley, the Court stated, “an award of attorney fees is permissible, but 
not mandatory, when a property owner litigates to remove a cloud on title.”7 This rational 
partially relied on Summa Corp. v. Greenspun (Summa I),8 where the Court affirmed the 
award of attorney fees because the cause of action was brought to remove a cloud upon 
title. The Court clarifies that the actual holding of Summa I is that a “plaintiff may 
recover as damages the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove a cloud on the 
plaintiff’s title.”9  
 
The Court points to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 633, which defines 
recoverable pecuniary loss as support for the majority rule that attorney fees qualify for 
special damages in action for slander of title to remove clouds from title. The Court 
reverses the district court’s award of attorney fees in this case because “no authority 
appears to support the proposition that attorney fees are available as special damages in a 
                                                 
4 123 Nev., Adv. Op. 53, p. 4-5. 
5 Id. at p. 5. 
6 117 Nev. 948, 35 P.3d 964 (2001).  
7 123 Nev., Adv. Op. 53, p. 9 (citing Michelsen v. Harvey, 110 Nev. 27, 30, 866 P.2d 1141, 1142 (1994)). 
8 96 Nev. 247, 607 P.2d 569 (1980).  
9 123 Nev., Adv. Op. 53, p. 11 (citing Wright v. Rogers, 342 P.2d 447 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) and 
Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 208 P.2d 959 (Utah 1949)).  
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case to remove a cloud upon title when no claim for slander of title has been alleged.”10 
The Court states the clarified rule as follows, “attorney fees are only available as special 
damages in slander of title actions and not simply when a litigant seeks to remove a cloud 
upon title.”11 Accordingly, since the district court did not find the Daiss group slandered 
title to real property, no attorney fees were available. The Court reverses this portion of 
the district court’s order.  
 
Concurring Opinion [Chief Justice Maupin] 
 
 Chief Justice Maupin stresses that the clarification of Sandy Valley does not 
preclude the prosecution of claims for attorney fees as special damages in other contexts.  
 
Conclusion 
  
 The Court affirms the district court’s holdings that the Daiss group failed to show 
they acquired a portion of the recreational easement through adverse use and that Daiss 
(servient tenant) may promulgate rules for the reasonable use of the easement. The Court 
also holds that the district court did not have the authority to promulgate rules and 
reverses this portion of the opinion. The Court reverses the district court’s awarding of 
attorney fees as special damages, clarifying the rule as only applying for slander of title 
causes of action. 
                                                 
10 Id. at p. 12. 
11 Id. at p. 13. 
